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Abstract 
Martin Heidegger‘s phenomenological interpretation of 
Aristotle‘s theory of rhetoric can be interpreted to 
understand the existential dimension of communication. 
Taking Heidegger‘s 1924 Marburg lecture, Being and Time 
and other texts dealing with the problem of the being of 
language as theoretical sources, this paper presents the 
importance of Heidegger‘s conception of rhetoric and 
analyses the ontological aspects of communication as 
such. Taking the understanding of being-in-the-world 
and speaking-with-one-another, further, it is argued that 
if rhetoric is a way of having the existential view about 
how matters present themselves in a particular manner by 
virtue of speaking about it with-one-another, then it is in 
the region of the doxa of people. A case study of rhetorical 
analysis of the film Blow-Up is used to explain the process 
of existential communication. 
Keywords: Existential Communication, Rhetoric, Heidegger, 
Language, Doxa 
1. Introduction 
Martin Heidegger‘s notion of rhetoric can be read as a conception 
of existential communication that explicates the ontological 
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dimension of communication. It is important to raise the question 
of communication afresh to consider all its interweaving ontic-
ontological aspects. I argue in this paper that Heidegger‘s notion of 
rhetoric in his 1924 interpretation of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric offers that 
possibility. Heidegger‘s rhetorical understanding of 
communication dwells on our everyday experience of 
communication to show that every ontic communicative expression 
comes out of more primordial disclosure of the world; it lays bare 
how the existential constituting structure of communication 
namely logos, pathos and ethos come together ecstatically disclosing 
the world in a meaningful way for human beings in their basic 
mode of existence, Being-in-the world speaking with-one-another.  
This paper has three sections after the introduction; the first section 
is to provide the necessary context by presenting the importance of 
Heidegger‘s unique appropriation of the classical notion of rhetoric 
from Aristotle; the next section focuses on the details of 
Heidegger‘s existential reading of rhetoric within Dasien‘s structure 
of disclosure, the concealed ontological dimension of everyday 
communication that which makes every ontic communication 
possible. The last section deals with the demonstration of this 
existential communication through an analysis of the film, Blow up. 
Finally, I present the conclusion based on the film analysis, the 
place of doxa in the framework of rhetoric. Though logos discloses 
the world, only rhetoric makes the re-disclosure possible.         
2. Situating Heidegger’s Rhetoric Lecture 
In this section I present the notion of existential communication, 
using Heidegger's early work that deals with language, 
communication, and rhetoric, directly or indirectly. I find Being and 
Time (BT; 1927) and the 1924 lecture course Basic Concepts of 
Aristotelian Philosophy (BCAP) relevant for the current task. Though 
I use other works of Heidegger, these two texts figure in a major 
way as they are influenced by Heidegger‘s existential 
appropriation of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric. 
 
Discourse as communication is a broader conception that takes into 
consideration the ontological dimension of Dasein by virtue of its 
relation to Being. All communication, whether reductively assertive 
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and propositional or thoughtfully disclosive, is embedded in the 
interweaving ontic-ontological dimensions. But when the disclosive 
nature of logos, the ontological dimension of Dasein‘s relation to 
language, is brought to articulation in the act of communication 
attentively, there is a qualitative difference in the very experience 
of communication for all those taking part in this process. One can 
say that in communication when it happens in this manner, the 
speaker and the listener cease to be ontologically separate as in the 
case of reductive propositional communication. This mode of 
communication that lets the discourse gather and present the 
existential possibility, which is concealed otherwise when the very 
occurrence of communication happens, depends on the quality of 
participation of the communicator, the receiver and the subject 
matter. Such an examination of possible modes of discourse is 
discussed in Heidegger‘s reading of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric and this 
creative interpretation is more accessibly presented in BCAP. It 
emphasises that the focus of rhetorical matter should be the 
interpretation of the being-there of human beings with regard to 
the basic possibility of speaking-with-one-another. It is possible to 
formulate discourse as existential communication based on his 
notion of discourse in BT as well as by going back to BCAP as one 
can see clearly there that the existential dimension of discourse 
emerges in Heidegger‘s encounter with Aristotle‘s Rhetoric. He 
writes in BCAP that ‗the λόγος [logos], which has this function of 
exhibiting, has the character of a definite communicating. I 
communicate with others; I have the world there with the other 
and the other has the world there with me, insofar as we talk 
something through—κοινωνία [koinonia] of the world. Speaking is, 
in itself, communicating; and, as communication, it is nothing other 
than κοινωνία‘ (Heidegger, 2009, p. 43). Even when one is 
communicating in the everyday mode, there needs to be a shared 
world among those participating. ‗Shared world‘ here means a 
community of people with a history and language, sharing a 
common ethos. 
However, Aristotle‘s own definition of rhetoric speaks about it in 
terms of persuasive techniques as the following passage from the 
Rhetoric shows:  
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Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given 
case the available means of persuasion…the power of observing the 
means of persuasion on almost any subject presented to us; and 
that is why we say that, in its technical character, it is not concerned 
with any special or definite class of subjects (Aristotle, 1984, 
p.4624).  
Unlike Plato, one can see that there is a positive understanding of 
rhetoric in Aristotle as techniques of persuasive speaking for 
creating or changing the perception about something in a definite 
way in those individuals who listen to it. Aristotle‘s Rhetoric would 
seem like a manual for the speaker to choose the right means of 
persuasion in a particular temporal context. However, Heidegger 
brought out a phenomenological understanding in the Rhetoric by 
focusing on what is unsaid in the text. Heidegger‘s interpretation 
has challenged the traditional place of rhetoric within Aristotle‘s 
works and most effectively affected the relationship of rhetoric to 
philosophy (Gross, 2017, p. 512). 
Heidegger‘s philosophical research relates to his discontent with 
the then existing philosophy of language and its formal approach 
to the question of meaning: how meaning arises out of the 
interaction between language and human beings. In fact, 
Heidegger did take Aristotle‘s treatment of pathos as presented in 
the second book of Rhetoric seriously. He took it beyond the 
psychological framework of subjective internal experience and 
formulated it as the ground from which logos emerges. Concepts 
like ready-to-hand, being-with, world and Dasein are extended and 
modified versions of Aristotle‘s oikos, koinonia/polis, ethos and praxis 
(Buren, 1994, pp. 226-228). The most important pillars of Being and 
Time, the existential structures of disclosedness, attunement, 
understanding, and discourse, are an appropriation of pathos, techne 
and phronesis, and logos and hermenia in Aristotle (Buren, 1994, p. 
228). Daniel Gross observes that the concept of rhetoric operating in 
Heidegger‘s lecture is so broad that he defines it as ―the study of 
how a human being is in the world through language‖ (2017, p. 
511).  
Heidegger‘s existential appropriation of Aristotle‘s rhetoric is a 
significant contribution to the question of meaning in the everyday 
context in comparison with the researches in the philosophy of 
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language. One cannot ignore the important developments in 
analytical philosophy in dealing with the question of meaning in 
everyday context, which are more sophisticated theories than 
Aristotle‘s in the Rhetoric. J. L. Austin‘s speech acts theory is one 
such development. He came up with conditions of successful 
speech act in the name of felicity conditions for ‗happy‘ 
functioning. Accordingly, speech acts do not have truth values but 
the success of such acts can be evaluated as appropriate or 
inappropriate. Austin, in How to Do Things with Words (1962), listed 
six conditionsi, failing to meet which will result in ‗unhappy‘ 
consequences that he calls as cases of misfires and abuses. While 
Austin‘s theory is a step beyond propositional content and 
certainly such a pragmatic notion of speech as the action is a 
further development in the philosophy of language, I want to point 
out that such an approach is still caught up in the traditional 
presumptions about the essence of human being and language.  
Heidegger‘s original notion of language and meaning allowed him 
to appropriate the idea of rhetoric through his interpretation of 
Aristotle that rhetoric is not just about communicating techniques 
to stir and manipulate people, trading on their emotions with least 
commitment to truth. Heidegger‘s effort to revisit Aristotle's 
Rhetoric in a lively way through his lecture for his students was 
significant. In fact, Gadamer once recounted his experience that it 
was as though seeing Aristotle alive as a contemporary thinker in 
the presentation of Heidegger when he attended the lecture as 
Heidegger‘s student (Gross, 2017, p. 519). It has also influenced 
many students of Heidegger like Hanna Arendt, Helene Weiss, 
Walter Brocker, and Ernst Tgendhat whose contributions to 
Aristotelian scholarship is noteworthy (Buren, 1994, p. 226). Such a 
task of reinterpreting Aristotle‘s basic concepts opened up new 
possibilities in philosophizing (Marassi, 1986, p. 96). Gadamer 
viewed Heidegger as an ‗Aristotelian redivivus‘, due to his 
kairological appropriation of Aristotle‘s basic concepts in a 
phenomenological way (Buren, 1994, p. 226). Heidegger 
acknowledges the importance of rhetoric in Being and Time (1962) in 
this way:  
contrary to the traditional orientation, according to 
which rhetoric is conceived as the kind of thing we 
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‗learn in school‘, this work of Aristotle must be taken 
as the first systematic hermeneutic of the 
everydayness of Being with one another. (p. 178) 
It is not only Aristotle‘s Rhetoric that gets revived but Heidegger 
did place Aristotle‘s ethics into the ontological horizon of the 
concept of Kinesis in the Physics, Metaphysics, De anima and De 
motuanimalium (Buren, 1994, p. 230). In the next section, we will 
first see in more detail Heidegger‘s appropriation of Aristotle‘s 
concept of rhetoric and its connection to the lifeworld, and then 
discuss more on the details of the constitutive structure of rhetoric 
in relation to Dasein‘s existential structure and mode of being-in-
the world. 
3. Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
According to Heidegger, Being-in in the sense of Being-in-the-
world is equiprimordial with Being-with other human beings. So 
Being-in-the-world-with-one-another is the basic mode of Dasein‘s 
existence and so the question of political existence is fundamental 
to Heidegger. In his Being and Truth lecture (1933-34), during which 
period he was involved in political activities, he asks the question: 
what it means to be a people. In his attempt to answer the question, 
Heidegger (2010) clarifies the notion of being-with-one-another:  
This with-one-another cannot be understood as based on 
the fact that there are many human beings whom one must 
keep in order; instead, we belong with one another to the 
state, we exist on the basis of the state. And this existence 
fulfills itself and takes shape through discourse, λόγος 
[logos]. The science that is concerned with the ability to talk, 
rhetoric, is the fundamental science of human beings, the 
political science. (p. 123) 
It is also possible to see rhetoric as an act of ethical performance as 
Aristotle treats it as an effort to attain a fitting response from an 
audience in a particular moment about something that matters to 
them. Indeed, rhetoric, as opposed to sophistry, is a better model of 
communicative ethics and Calvin Schrag in his book, 
Communicative Praxis and the Space of Subjectivity (1986), describes 
how rhetoric and ethics meet in the space of ethos through the 
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Greek concept of kathokonta (fitting response) (Schrag, 1986, p.  202). 
Schrag writes: ―the fitting response is thus enjoined to do double 
duty―to preserve the tradition, without which communication 
could not proceed, and to critique the tradition in search of a 
pharmakon [emphasis added] that might remedy its conceptual and 
existential ills‖ (Schrag, 1986, p.  207). Discourse in its everydayness 
gives rise to either genuine discourse (in the mode of the disclosure 
of phenomena that matter to humans) or idle talk (in the mode of 
the phenomena that appear superficially), and thus discourse when 
guided by rhetoric can become such a pharmakon or therapeutic 
remedy.  
While rhetoric lends itself for wrong purposes too, the concrete 
situation in which the needs of people calling for a response is an 
opportunity for a phronetic engagement with right deliberation and 
judgement to guide people towards what is good at that given 
situation for them (Hyde, 1994, p.  382). Any speaker who is 
attuned to the temporal moment in which one finds oneself along 
with other listeners brings to view for all to see the ‗articulation of 
actuality by means of possibility‘ (Marshall, 2017, p. 59). David 
Marshall (2017) notes that these kinds of performances are not to be 
thought in terms of special skills but as performances emerging 
from habituation and repetition:  
If we wish to appropriate Heideggerian concepts for 
the purposes of rhetorical analysis, our focus should 
be everydayness—as a capacity to begin again (and 
again), as a modal category with which to organize 
our sense of the appearing of the world, and as an 
account of how that which is present shades absent. 
(p. 69)  
It is important to note here that the nature of practical 
comportment is always open-ended and never reaches completion 
as perfection, be it use of techne or phronesis. 
If one accepts Thomas Sheehan‘s understanding of Being that it is 
nothing but the meaningful presence of things and the world to 
human beings, then this ontological dimension of being-there in a 
meaningful way is the primordial way in which we encounter our 
world (Heidegger, 2009, p. 203). According to Thomas Sheehan 
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what disclosedness of things to Dasein involve are, ―(1) the relative 
stability and constancy of the meaningful thing (währen); (2) the locus 
of its meaningful appearance, namely the world of human concerns 
(-vor-); and (3) a certain movement into appearance, a thing‘s being 
brought from an undisclosed but potential intelligibility into an 
actually operative one (in die Unverborgenheit)‖ (Sheehan, 2014, p. 
252). Disclosedness happens as a result of being-with the other and 
the world is given to someone by virtue of being a part of the 
speech community, culture and its ethos; in short, it is out of the 
passively accepted doxa that we make sense of things. The how of 
being-with-one-another is an ontological-existential condition out 
of which the ontic everyday communication is made possible and, 
after all, rhetoric performances are deliberate amplifications of 
mundane interactions and discussions among people. This 
pragmatic comportment of the know-how of being in the concrete 
moment is not a special art but arises out of what is given to Dasein 
as the primordial understanding of being in its ordinary life. In fact, 
Allen Scult would go on to argue that it is the dynamics of rhetoric 
that let us choose to act out of the given set of language possibilities 
that shape our world. It even includes the possibility of philosophy:  
The locus of ―the ‗how‘ of the being of philosophy is located within 
the ‗how‘ of the being of rhetoric‖ (Scult, 1999, p. 150). Any context 
of rupture or unexpected crisis is the context for the new possibility 
of understanding the inconspicuous existential structures operating 
in everydayness.  
Heidegger discusses in Being and Time how the unexpected 
breakdown in the everyday activities due to the failure of 
equipment exposes them in a new light; i.e. as the transition from 
the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand mode of engagement. 
Theodore Kisiel thinks that the political crisis in Germany in the 
1930s opened up for Heidegger new possibilities of seeing the 
ontological operations that were concealed prior to this historical 
moment. Kisiel (2000) writes: ―Aristotle‘s Rhetoric is for Heidegger 
accordingly a hermeneutics of everydayness in crisis, of being with 
one another in an everydayness that has been radically disturbed 
and thus exposed, in its structures, for ready ontological 
examination‖ (p. 201). As existential possibilities unfold in a 
particular crisis situation, it calls for responses and thus sometimes 
the world speaks to itself and Dasein may or may not listen to the 
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voice of being. This existential dimension of disclosedness in the 
mode of being-in-the-world-along-with-others in this kind of 
unexpected rupture in the normal routine needs articulation in a 
manner that resonates with the ethos of the people. This new 
sprout of understanding can be made sense of positively only if it 
comes out of the tradition even if the sprout is against the common 
doxa; i.e., that which also can be otherwise. Kisiel demonstrates that 
Heidegger‘s existential appropriation of Aristotle‘s Rhetoric brings 
together the core elements pathos, ethos and logos as always already 
present in any speech situation, and parallels the three disclosive 
structural moments of Dasein correspondingly: disposition, 
understanding and discourse (Kisiel, 2000, p. 201). 
If Dasein is existentially never closed, then its relation to its world 
in moments of crisis should be seen as an opportunity for authentic 
resolve; being open and listening to the silent call of conscience is 
an option only if one is receptive to being‘s communication—
acknowledging the nullity, thereby embracing the finitude of 
human life. Such an experience manifests in the articulation of the 
saying of being. At such moments, existence communicates to 
Dasein in a passive way in order for it to appropriate the meaning 
of existence actively. Such response of Dasein to the call of Being de 
facto shows that Being indeed needs human beings for it to 
articulate the rupture/exposure/disclosure of the world in the 
explicit discourse of Dasein. Stuart Elden recognises the logos as the 
highest possibility of human being within the mode of being-with-
one-another. Within this sphere of existential communication, the 
difference between speaking and listening is not useful except in an 
analytical sense. Elden (2005) argues that ―Logos is a possibility of 
human being, which brings it to the highest possibility of its being, 
the euzen. But this is no longer mere logos, but dialektos, speaking 
with others, hermeneia, moving toward an understanding with 
others. Speaking is therefore at one with the mode of hearing, 
listening‖(p. 288). Dasein is a kind of being that is existentially 
driven by non-being in sync with the future orientation of its 
temporal structure of care. Sheehan explains this: ―imperfect being 
engenders an imperfect locus of meaning: the world as the dynamic-
transitive realm of mediation‖ (Sheehan, 2005, p. 206). Thus, Dasein 
in its everyday concern exists as speaking-with others (negotiating, 
discussing, struggling) on the basis of its existential structure, 
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which is always oriented towards the not yet realised existential 
possibilities, primordially given in one‘s thrownness, which in turn 
determines their concrete meaning in the present moment in terms 
of the ontic concerns of one‘s self along with others and the world.  
The rhetorical approach to communication amplifies the inherent 
possibilities that lie within the structure of communication and in 
effect, it moves the listeners as well as lets the phenomenon of 
interest manifest as it is. What are its conditions of possibility? If 
communication rhetorically understood is logos that performs its 
function appropriately with respect to the ethos and pathos of the 
listeners, communication is possible when its constitutive elements 
are present in a balanced way in coherence with the doxa, mood 
and the subject matter of the listening people. According to my 
reading of Heidegger‘s conception of ‗rhetoric‘, the existential 
interpretation of it presents ‗rhetoric‘ with its fundamental 
connection to doxa and mood; it is in doxa that anything is shown 
initially. Pathos is the ground condition of logos. Heidegger (2009) 
writes the following in his discussion about the connection of pathos 
to logos:  
Insofar as λόγος [logos] is taken as speaking-with-one-
another, which has the function of working out the 
interpretation of being-there in its everydayness. Insofar as 
the πάθη [pathē]are not merely an annex of psychical 
processes, but are rather the ground out of which speaking 
arises, and which what is expressed grows back into, the πάθη 
[pathē], for their part, are the basic possibilities in which being-
there itself is primarily oriented toward itself, finds itself. (p. 
176) 
It is established that epistemic inquiry begins by doubting 
commonsense. It aims for universal knowledge, whereas rhetoric 
begins and ends in doxa within the sphere of the ethos of a speech 
community with an aim to genuinely present the phenomenon to 
the listener in its concrete attuned being-there. Succinctly 
Heidegger writes (2009) ―indeed, δόξα [doxa]is the characteristic of 
trust in that which shows itself initially. And that which shows itself 
initially is the basis of the investigation of the matter itself‖ (Heidegger, 
2009, p. 103). He notices the inner connection of logos to doxa: 
―Λόγος [logos], negotiating something, is constantly latent; in δόξα 
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[doxa], bringing-to-language is constantly on the alert. Δόξα [doxa] 
is precisely that from which speaking-with-one-another arises, by 
which it is motivated; and, at the same time, it is also that with 
which it negotiates‖ (Heidegger, 2009, p. 102). He also points out 
the possibility of idle talk: ―In this structure of δόξα [doxa], lies the 
possibility of its reaching a characteristic authority and stubbornness‖ 
(Heidegger, 2009, p. 102). Therefore, one can see that the locus of 
existential communication in the shared world is in the doxa.  The 
region of rhetoric, therefore, is ethos as any rhetorical performance 
will work with it, of it and ultimately also modify it. It is similar to 
the very function of philosophy as a possibility that comes out of 
the ordinary common conversation and also challenges the 
commonsense when new critical possibilities emerge with reason.  
Having seen the fundamental relation of doxa to rhetoric, it is clear 
that rhetoric in this sense goes beyond the reduced notion of being 
a technique in the business of persuasion. The border 
understanding of rhetoric can be appreciated only when it is 
experienced or illustrated in its concrete everyday life experience. 
So, I am presenting my analysis of the film Blow-Up, in the 
following section to show how rhetoric operates in a 
photographer‘s day. It is an attempt to demonstrate how phronetic 
communicative performance like any artistic creation such as music 
takes all possible and available means in the given concrete context 
to achieve its telos (Buren, 1994, p. 234). 
3. A Rhetorical Analysis of Blow-Up 
Michelangelo Antonioni‘s Blow-Up shows the lifeworld of a young 
photographer (David Hemmings) in the 1960s in a way that can 
help us see how rhetoric works in terms of its possibilities. Every 
communicative context is rhetorical but only sometimes the 
genuinely open possibilities of the rhetorical context may come to 
the fore. The way Hemmings relates to people and things around 
indicates the nature of his relation to his world. As a modern 
photographer in London, he is involved in his work; he clicks a 
variety of photos that reflect different shades of the city such as 
violence, homelessness and peace for a photo-documentary. He 
takes photos of a young model (Veruschka) as if he possesses her 
by demanding of her certain kinds of poses. The way he takes 
Deepak Pandiaraj                                                            Heidegger on Rhetoric 
82 
control of her with his camera clearly shows that he knows what 
exactly he wants from her. He loses his temper during a photo 
shoot when the models do not fit themselves according to his 
imagination about how they should move and maintain 
themselves. His understanding of his right as a photographer is 
above the considerations of the feelings of his subjects. His arrogant 
disposition towards women subjects can be made sense of better if 
it is juxtaposed with the discourse of modern scientific knowledge, 
founded on the certainty of truth because Hemmings understands 
the legitimacy of the medium of photography in terms of its power 
to capture the truth. His interactions with the models and also with 
two teenage girls who beg him for a chance to pose clearly depicts 
the position of women as subjects to be represented in his world. At 
one point in the film the photographer after listening to the 
conversation with an artist named Bill (John Castle) about the 
experience of spontaneity in bringing the abstract expressions out 
in the form of painting, responds with a question, ―can I buy it?‖ 
Bill, in turn, says ―No‖ to Hemmings, signifying his lack of 
receptivity at that moment in the conversation as well as in his 
artistic relation to things.ii 
In the course of the day, when Hemmings visits an antique shop, 
an old man almost chases him away as if he knows that the young 
man does not know how to value things from the past. While 
waiting for the shop owner to while away time and ward off his 
boredom he starts clicking pictures. As he is clicking, he walks into 
a public park where he takes some random pictures of landscape, 
nature, birds, and unexpectedly encounters a couple at a distance 
in the silent ambience. Hemmings immediately snaps photos of a 
mysterious woman (Vanessa Redgrave) with a man in his business 
suit, who seems to be older than her (Ronan O'Casey). Upon 
noticing this, the young woman comes running towards him to tell 
him to stop taking pictures. She seemed to be in a state of terror 
and she pleaded him to give her the film without any success. Not 
only he refused her plea but continued to take pictures as she was 
moving away from him till she disappeared. Then he goes back to 
the antique shop and manages to buy an old propeller, which he 
finds attractive. But the way he handles and perceives the propeller 
reflects his tendency to immediately possess things that he finds 
attractive without really understanding anything about them. 
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Just after the purchase Hemmings meets Ron for whom he works. 
He discusses with Ron about those pictures for the photo-
documentary and mentions that he has taken a fabulous picture in 
the park. And he suggests to Ron that what he clicked in the park 
could be placed as the final photo to end the documentary on peace 
as the earlier photos portrayed violent and miserable aspects of the 
city. The pictures taken according to him at that moment gave him 
pleasant feelings as they appeared to him as the beautiful 
mysterious women, the feeling of love, and the green landscape 
with birds and so on. Then he goes back to the studio to find that 
Vanessa Redgrave desperately wanted to retrieve the film before it 
is developed. He didn‘t expect her so soon just after she confronted 
him for the film in the park. In her attempts to seduce him in order 
to steal the film she fails. But she seems to be attracted to him and 
gives in to his play only to get deceived by him as he intentionally 
gives her the wrong film roll. When he starts developing the 
pictures in the real roll, he begins to find something enigmatic in 
the photos. The photos no more evoke pleasant feelings when he 
figures something enigmatic in the gaze of the mysterious women 
in one of the pictures. Like the way a detective works, he further 
takes the direction of the gaze as a clue to solve this enigma by 
zooming in that area where the gaze was pointing to. He concludes 
finally that she was looking at someone holding a gun hiding in the 
bush. It is interesting to note that this part of the movie goes on 
without any music to emphasise the real, silent enigmatic call. The 
director for some reason never gives any name to the main 
characters, the arrogant photographer, and the mysterious woman, 
in the movie. At some point when the photographer asks her name 
or phone number, she writes her phone number. Having figured 
out the truth about the attempted murder, Hemmings immediately 
dials the phone number that she gave to him only to realise that she 
deceived him giving a wrong number. This is when he begins to 
feel something more enigmatic and he calls Ron immediately. He 
shares with Ron about his feelings related to the photos in the park 
until it gets interrupted by those teen ‗birds‘ waiting to be 
photographed. I quote the words he utters to Ron to show that he is 
unable to make sense of his feelings: ―Something fantastic‘s 
happened. Those photographs in the park, fantastic! Somebody 
was trying to kill somebody else. I saved his life.‖ 
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Hemming‘s self-understanding as a photographer is disturbed by 
the series of enigmatic events unfolding. He is no more in control of 
things and people as he used to be. Instead, everything is elusive 
and he is being moved by things and people around him. This 
unusual feeling is probably difficult to face and so he invites the 
distraction happily by letting the teen girls into the studio. He does 
not take pictures of them but he is playing with them. Suddenly he 
sends them off as if he finds something enigmatic in one of those 
hanging pictures. It is the photo of a long shot of the mysterious 
young girl running away from him in the park just before she 
disappeared. When he observes it in different shades of lighting 
and magnifies that suspicious section of the photograph, he 
resolves finally that what he sees might be a dead body lying on the 
ground. This time again another layer of the same event captured 
in the park reveals something that shocked him. Immediately he 
leaves the studio to the park a second time but without his camera. 
Only when he nears the dead body did he realise that his 
habituated hands could not reach the camera. He realises that he 
does not have what gives him so much power when he needed it 
most, the camera. He wants to click pictures of the dead body but 
he cannot. Feeling helpless he goes back to his home to witness Bill 
making love with his wife, Patrica (Sarah Miles). His voyeuristic 
desire keeps his eyes stuck. Apparently, Patrica enjoys it and 
requests him not to leave as she is reaching the peak of pleasure. 
Then he returns to his studio to find all pictures developed and the 
negative missing except for one picture. That one picture is the only 
evidence he is left with which is coarse due to low resolution and 
high magnification. Patricia comments on the only evidence when 
she comes there to meet him and he explains what happened: ―it 
looks like one of Bill‘s paintings‖. It just means that he cannot now 
be sure of anything he thinks about what happened in the park and 
the only picture left is so abstract that it can be interpreted any 
way. 
Hemmings rushes immediately to meet wherever Ron is and, on 
the way, he spots the girl in the park. Before he stops the car and 
gets down to the spot, she is missing. He goes in search of her but 
in vain and enters a music concert. What happens in there has 
something to tell us about his destabilised world. When the 
guitarist smashes his guitar and throws it to the audience, there 
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was chaos. It happens all of a sudden that the audience turns into a 
crazy mob, and everyone is trying to get hold of the broken guitar. 
He goes wild, stirred by the event happening there, and finally 
manages to get the neck of the guitar. As soon as he escapes out of 
the frenzied mob, he just stares at them, discards it on the floor, and 
heads to Ron‘s place. This just shows that while he is sure of what 
he wants from others as a photographer, he is not sure of his own 
world. Just like he wanted to buy one of Bill‘s paintings, he brought 
the propeller instinctually. When he was asked about the purpose 
of the propeller, he has no deep feelings or reason for it but he says, 
―nothing, it is beautiful‖. Probably his words indicate that deep 
inside him he is homeless and his job as the photographer is really 
inauthentic insofar as the meaning of life comes from that 
profession. He did express his dissatisfaction with his work in his 
earlier meeting with Ron and that he wanted to be free. But then he 
has nothing to say about what kind of freedom he is searching 
when Ron provokes him on that. This enigmatic feeling that resists 
any articulation in understanding and expression in language is 
shown brilliantly in the movie through other characters too. Even 
the antique shop owner does not know what she wants but she is 
sure that she does not enjoy running the antique shop. Patrica is 
unhappy with her marriage but she is not sure what to do. This 
existential dimension of ‗nothingness‘ communicates to Hemmings 
in the way things and people are elusive, but he distracts himself 
with all kinds of tasks that are familiar to him as the master.  
Continuing the story, he reaches the place where Ron is enjoying 
the party with Veruschka and others. While he tries to get Ron‘s 
attention, he sees Veruschka and remembers that she is supposed 
to be in Paris. When he expressed it to her, she replies that she is in 
Paris. He then continues to convince Ron that it is really important 
to take a shot of the corpse lying in the park. Ron who is 
disoriented does not share his urgency and did not find any sense 
in what he says. So, Ron in response says: ―I am not a 
photographer‖ and in turn asks him ―What did you see in that 
park?‖  His answer to that question is ―Nothing‖ indicating that 
there is no point in persuading Ron. 
Hemmings sleeps there that night and as soon as he wakes up the 
next day, he visits the park in hurry with his camera to get the shot 
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of the dead body. It turns out that this time he has the camera but 
what he wants to capture as evidence has disappeared again. He 
hits the camera signifying his ultimate giving up of his efforts to 
secure the ‗truth‘ that his camera/eyes witnessed. Nothing more to 
hold on as he walks holding the camera without showing any 
inveterate manifestation of the photographer as we know him 
through the movie. Probably for the first time he does not use his 
camera to capture something and he realises that he is actually in 
the grip of something enigmatic. When he accepts the ‗nothingness‘ 
and co-responds to what is there open in the world, he watches the 
tennis mime performed by the same group of merrymakers. There 
is neither ball nor racket with them but there is a game that unfolds 
before his eyes. He did not distract himself or immediately take 
pictures; instead, he participates in the game by responding to its 
disclosure. When everyone turned towards the direction of the ball 
that crossed over the fence and one of the players expresses 
through her embodied speech that he is expected to retrieve the 
ball, he runs and tosses the ball back. Now he even hears the sound 
of the ball hitting the racket pointing to the fact that he is really free 
now. He now knows that truth just like art discloses itself in the 
way it wants and one can only be open to it in order to know it but 
can never master it. He comes to terms with himself and the 
situation as he listens to what life existentially communicates.  
Thus, Being speaks rhetorically in the horizon of multiple 
possibilities and only those who are open to the rhetoric of life, art, 
can ‗be‘ free. What it means ‗to be‘ in the true sense as far as human 
beings are concerned is to be free in this sense. Finally, Blow-Up 
comes to an end, revealing the essence of the communication of 
Being: Being speaks to us in the way it presents or re-presents the 
world by concealing itself. The photographer himself disappears at 
the end of the movie emphasising that Being is Being when it 
lingers in its appearances and vanishes in time for the 
manifestation of other possibilities.  
4. Conclusion 
Rhetoric, as understood by Heidegger, recognises the primordial 
truth at work in communication (truth as aletheia or 
unconcealment/disclosure) as the fundamental way humans relate 
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with their world; in other words, disclosive communication. Dasein 
as being-in-the world is always already in communication 
primordially with its world as Being discloses itself through 
language. Dasein‘s moods or dispositions (pathos) disclose the 
passive way in which the world affects humans; that is their 
thrownness. Dasein‘s projection (ethos) of its possibilities in terms 
of its self-understanding based on the interpretation and 
understanding of its place in society is another existential feature 
that keeps it always ahead of itself; that is, its projective 
understanding. These two existential aspects of Dasein—thrown 
projection—are equiprimordial and they are articulated in 
discourse  (Logos) that gathers all that is and makes them present in 
its appearances (and re-apperances). Human beings exist in their 
everydayness with average intelligibility or doxa, the existential 
primordial view through its attuned understanding by virtue the 
discourse/language that posses them. 
The importance of rhetorical performances, to which pertains our 
common use of the word ‗rhetoric‘, lies in the possibility of seeing 
how the subject matter presents itself in the basic mode of human 
beings speaking with one another. It amplifies these existential 
elements that operate in the everyday mode of existence, which 
existentially communicate and thus either maintain or modify the 
doxa—that which is responsible for the meaningfulness of 
things/world, self and others. The film analysis demonstrates that 
the rhetorical notion of communication does not privilege the 
ontological dimension as if it determines ontic expression in ontic 
language just like one-way traffic, but it shows how the ontological 
coincides with ontic material expressions. This rhetorical way of 
understanding ontological dimension of communication brings out 
how the actuality changes the existential possibilities of the 
photographer is disclosed: David Hemings‘ experience of the world 
as a photographer in the 1960s London, whereby everything 
around him including people become objects of his photographic 
representation, finally reaches its limit as a particular unanticipated 
experience opens up to him new ways of seeing the world. Thus, 
when one co-responds to the rhetoric of Being by heeding the 
enigmatic silent call, our world is disclosed differently nevertheless 
in the form of authentic meaningful renewed doxa. 
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End notes 
                                                          
i (A.I) There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a 
certain conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of 
certain words by certain persons in certain circumstances, and further, 
(A. 2) the particular persons and circumstances in a given case must be 
appropriate for the invocation of the particular procedure invoked. 
(B. I) The procedure must be executed by all participants both correctly 
and 
(B. 2) completely. 
( Γ.I) Where, as often, the procedure is designed for use by persons having 
certain thoughts or feelings, or for the inauguration of certain 
consequential conduct on the part of any participant, then a person 
participating in and so invoking the procedure must in fact have those 
thoughts or feelings, and the participants must intend so to conduct 
themselves, and further 
(Γ. 2) must actually so conduct themselves subsequently (see: Austin, 
1994, pp. 14-15). 
ii My analysis is inspired by Nikolas Kompridis‘s idea of ‗enigma‘ in his 
reading of the film Blow-Up (Kompridis, 2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
